Although the Allied forces had advanced so much that the supplies could no longer catch up, it still threatened the German border, making Adolf Hitler uncomfortable. He decided to call for a large-scale offensive with the intension to cause heavy casualties and to divide the Allied forces, therefore cutting off certain Allied units of their supplies and surrounding others. Should the Allies be dealt a major blow in the west, Hitler thought, he would be in a much better position to defend against a likely winter offensive by the Russians. He realized it was a gamble, knowing that a failed major offensive might spell the final doom for Germany; however, "I am determined to hold fast to the execution of this operation, regardless of any risk," he said, "even if the enemy offensives on both sides of the Metz and the imminent attack on the Rhine territory lead to great terrain and town losses." Hitler believed that, due to his lack of understanding of the Allied command structure, that Alli

虽然盟军先进以至于供应不再能赶上，还威胁到德国边界，使阿道夫希特勒感到不舒服。他决定要求进行一次大规模进攻与内涵，造成严重的人员伤亡和分裂的盟军部队，因此切断某些盟军部队的供应和周围的人。如果盟友是当头一棒，在西方，希特勒认为，他将在一个更好的位置，以防可能被苏军冬季攻势。他意识到这是一场赌博，知道失败的主要的进攻可能导致德国最后的厄运；然而，“我决定抓住这个操作的执行，无论任何风险，”他说，“即使敌人进攻的梅斯两侧及莱茵河境内迫在眉睫攻击导致巨大的地形和城市的损失。”希特勒认为，由于缺乏的盟军司令部结构的理解，盟军最高指挥官，德怀特艾森豪威尔必须在犯重大的战略转变，得到上级的许可，以及德国的战争机器的操作。这样的通信延迟，希特勒认为，将给德国的进攻另一个惊喜的上风。

"We gamble everything now", Gerd von Rundstedt said when he had learned of Hitler's order for a major offensive on the western front. "We cannot fail."

“我们赌上一切”，龙德施泰特将军说，当他得知希特勒为主要的进攻在西部战线。”我们不能失败。”

Preparations
The eventual plan was prepared by Alfred Jodl and presented to Hitler on 9 Oct. With some alterations, the plan was adopted and was renamed Wacht Am Rhein, "Watch on the Rhine"; this plan called for an attack by infantry to open a gap in the thinly defended Ardennes forest, allowing German tanks to punch through the gaps. The final destination was Antwerp, the newly acquired port that was critical in the Allies' logistical operations. Knowing the Allies were intercepting German radio communications, the Germans also put up a major deceptive operation, Operation Greif, that further contributed to the Allied unpreparedness when the offensive was launched. First, the name of the offensive, Wacht Am Rhein, was highly misleading in that it was suggestive of a defensive operation, perhaps near the German city of Aachen. Then, a series of efforts by the daring and innovative Otto Skorzeny convinced the Allied forces to commit their forces at the wrong spots.

准备工作
由艾尔弗雷德约德尔准备和提交给希特勒在10月9有一些改变是最终的计划，该计划被采纳并改名为�莱茵河，“看莱茵河”；这个计划呼吁攻击步兵在薄保卫阿登森林打开一个缺口，使德军坦克穿透缝隙。最后的目的地是安特卫普，新收购的港口，盟军的后勤运作是至关重要的。知道盟军拦截德国无线电通信，德国人也提出了一个重大的欺骗性的操作，操作格瑞夫，进一步促成了盟军不意当进攻。第一，进攻的名�，莱茵河畔，是极具误导性的，这是暗示的防御作战，也许在德国城市亚琛。然后，通过一系列大胆和创新的奥托·斯科尔兹内相信盟军提交他们的部队在错误的地方工作。

The first of Skorzeny's plans called for a Trojan horse mission with the 150th Panzer Brigade driving captured American and British tanks; the objective was the capture of bridges on the Meuse. Then German commandos were to be dressed in American uniforms and sent behind enemy lines; these English-speaking commandos were ordered to report Allied movements, change road signs, and even daringly pose as traffic duty soldiers and misdirect Allied trucks carrying soldiers and supplies. 44 of such commandos were sent, and only 8 returned at the end of the battle, achieving various degrees of success. Finally, Skorzeny also spread out rumors that German paratroopers were going to be dropped behind Allied lines. As these rumors grew, the outrageousness of these rumors grew as well, with several versions noting that paratroopers were to be dropped in Paris to seize Eisenhower. Immediately after the battle began, both real and dummy paratroopers under the command of Colonel Friedrich August von

对斯科尔兹内的计划要求与第一百五十装甲旅的美国和英国的坦克驾驶捕获特洛伊木马的第一个使命；目的是在默兹河的桥梁的捕获。当时的德国突击队员穿着美国制服，送到敌后；这些讲英语的突击队员奉命报告联盟的运动，改变道路标志，甚至大胆地提出交通勤务兵和误导的盟军士兵和物资的卡车。44这样的突击队被返回，只有8个在战争结束时，取得了不同程度的成功。最后，斯科尔兹内还散布谣言说德国伞兵要落后于盟军线。这些谣言的成长，这些传闻也同样也有所增加，与几个版本指出伞兵被丢弃在巴黎抓住艾森豪威尔。后立即开始战斗，不管是真实的和虚拟的伞兵上校弗里德里希八月von der海德特的指挥下了进一步的“确认”来迷惑盟军防御的谣言。

A unplanned achievement of this paratrooper rumor was that the Americans put up roadblocks at every road junction and checked every passer by for identification, dramatically slowing the transportation system that was so critical for the Allied war effort; even British General Bernard Montgomery was stopped and checked so many times that he later asked Eisenhower for an American identification card to speed up the process.

这谣言一无计划的成就是伞兵的美国人把路障在每个路口检查每个路人的识别，显着放缓的运输系统，为联盟的战争努力至关重要；甚至是英国的伯纳德-蒙哥马利将军被停止，检查的次数太多了，后来他问艾森豪威尔一个美国的识别卡加快速度。

The troop preparations were disguised as much as possible as well. As fresh German troops arrived at Cologne for the offensive, the soldiers were told that these were replacement units for the front. Troops moved into the Ardennes under the cover of the night, and during the day the thick forest provided excellent cover. To prevent Allied interception of battle plans, in the final days communications were to be carried by officer couriers only. Although Luftwaffe planes sent flying up and down the front lines drowned out most of the noise, heavy equipment noises were still reported by Allied troops. Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel knew that further discoveries of the offensive preparations were unavoidable, so he issued a fake order that had the German troops in the Cologne and Bonn areas prepare for a suspected Allied invasion. Playing well into the Wacht Am Rhein misinterpretation, this order successfully downplayed any Allied suspicion of German preparing for an offensive.

部队准备伪装尽可能一样多。新鲜的德国军队抵达科隆的进攻，士兵们被告知，这些是前更换单元。部队转移到阿登在夜色的掩护下，在茂密的森林，提供优良的盖天。为了防止盟军拦截的战斗计划，在最后的日子里，通信是由军官信使只。虽然空军飞机送上下翻飞前线淹没了大部分的噪声，重型设备噪声仍然被盟军部队报告。陆军元帅凯特尔知道进攻准备进一步的发现是不可避免的，因此他发出虚假的顺序在科隆和波恩地区的德国军队，准备一个可疑的入侵。打到�莱茵河畔的曲解，为了成功地对任何的盟军怀疑德国准备进攻。

The German units summoned for this Dec 1944 offensive (delayed from its original Nov target date) were:

德军的召唤，这月1944的进攻（延迟从原来的目标日期是11月）：